2023/06/24 by Jonas B. Sandbrink, Sandbrink, Jonas B. · 7 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Computer Science · #Bacillus and Francisella bacterial research #Computers and Society (cs.CY) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Law, AI, and Intellectual Property
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2306.13952
openalex publication_date 2023/06/24 · openalex created_date 2023/06/29 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
As advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) propel progress in the life sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that could pose such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4 and its successors, might provide dual-use information and thus remove some barriers encountered by historical biological weapons efforts. As LLMs are turned into multi-modal lab assistants and autonomous science tools, this will increase their ability to support non-experts in performing laboratory work. Thus, LLMs may in particular lower barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, the convergence of LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological agents and could make them broadly accessible. A range of interventions would help to manage risks. Independent pre-release evaluations could help understand the capabilities of models and the effectiveness of safeguards. Options for differentiated access to such tools should be carefully weighed with the benefits of openly releasing systems. Lastly, essential for mitigating risks will be universal and enhanced screening of gene synthesis products.