2023/01/23 by Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui, Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2301.09306
openalex publication_date 2023/01/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free mechanisms exist over piecewise-constant valuations. We demonstrate that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism can exist in the connected-piece scenario, and the same impossibility result occurs for hungry agents. We also show that no deterministic, truthful dictatorship mechanism can satisfy the envy-free criterion, and the same result remains true for non-wasteful constraints rather than dictatorship. We further address several related problems and directions.