2000/04/04 by Dorit Aharonov, Aharonov, Dorit, Amnon Ta‐Shma +7
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Cryptography and Data Security #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Physics (quant-ph) #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0004017
10 pages. To appear in STOC 2000 (Proceedings of the Thirty Second Annual ACM Symposium on Theory Of Computing.)
arxiv created 2000/04/04 · openalex publication_date 2000/04/04 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2024/04/11 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive - \em quantum bit escrow. In this primitive Alice commits to a bit b to Bob. The commitment is \em binding in the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal the bit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having a good probability of being detected cheating. The commitment is \em sealing in the sense that if Bob learns information about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to prove he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good probability. Rigorously proving the correctness of quantum cryptographic protocols has proved to be a difficult task. We develop techniques to prove quantitative statements about the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow protocol. A related primitive we construct is a quantum biased coin flipping protocol where no player can control the game, i.e., even an all-powerful cheating player must lose with some constant probability, which stands in sharp contrast to the classical world where such protocols are impossible.