2018/03/09 by Constandina Koki, Koki, Constandina, Stefanos Leonardos +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #91C99 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #J.4 #Media Influence and Politics
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1803.03445
openalex publication_date 2018/03/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We revisit the May and June 2012 Greek Parliamentary elections and the December 2014 Presidential election that was held by the June-elected Parliament. The three voting instances provide a political field experiment for the application of power indices and their interpretation in context. We model the Greek Parliament as a weighted majority game and assess voting power with the Shapley-Shubik, Holler and when relevant, Coleman's indices. Also, based on the actual events, we establish connections between parties and evaluate the Myerson index. We focus on the influence of institutional rules on the distribution of power among the elected political parties and add an alternative input to the ongoing political debate about the reform of both the Parliamentary and Presidential electoral system in Greece. Additionally, our findings contribute to the understanding of the coalition formation process in the particular context and provide empirical evidence on the performance of non-selective indices in parliamentary multi-party settings which can be used for comparison by similar case-studies in the future.