2020/06/10 by Jobst Heitzig, Heitzig, Jobst, Forest W. Simmons +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #91A80 #91B12 #91B14 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic Policies and Impacts #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #General Economics (econ.GN) #J.4 #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2006.06548
openalex publication_date 2020/06/10 · openalex created_date 2021/02/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an\nequal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote\nconsensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the\nstatus quo or rely too much on chance?\n We show the answer is yes by describing two nondeterministic voting methods,\none based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional\ncommitments to approve compromise options. Our theoretical analysis and\nagent-based simulation experiments suggest that with these, majorities cannot\nconsistently suppress minorities as with deterministic methods, proponents of\nthe status quo cannot block decisions as in consensus-based approaches, the\nresulting aggregate welfare is comparable to existing methods, and average\nrandomness is lower than for other nondeterministic methods.\n