2014/09/22 by George Kesidis, Kesidis, George, Douglas Mercer +5
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Engineering · #Digital Platforms and Economics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #ICT Impact and Policies #Merger and Competition Analysis #Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) #cs.NI
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1409.6281
arxiv created 2014/09/22 · openalex publication_date 2014/09/22 · arxiv updated 2014/09/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider a simple two-player game involving a large incumbent and small entrant into a cellular wireless access provider marketplace. The entrant's customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are regulated, because if they are dictated by the incumbent then they could be set so high so as to be a barrier to entry in the marketplace. The game is studied at its Nash equilibrium. A roaming charge is identified that is arguably fair in the sense that revenues for the access providers are proportionate to their infrastructure costs.