2023/04/17 by Ali Lazrak, Jianfeng Zhang, Lazrak, Ali +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Business #Democracy #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #FOS: Economics and business #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #General Economics (econ.GN) #Law #Microeconomics #Outcome (game theory) #Polarization (electrochemistry) #Political science #Politics #Public administration #Public economics #Voting #Welfare #Welfare reform
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2304.08008
published in arXiv (Cornell University) (Cornell University)
openalex publication_date 2023/04/17 · openalex created_date 2023/04/21 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through coordinated non-negative transfer promises, made prior to voting and contingent on the vote outcome. In equilibrium, these transfers are structured to prevent any coalition from profitably deviating in a coordinated way, while minimizing total transfers. We provide a complete characterization of these `strong' equilibria and show that they exist, are indeterminate, efficient, and involve transfers from high- to low-utility members. Such transfers prevent opponents from swaying less enthusiastic supporters and may be directed not only to opponents but also to lukewarm supporters.