2016/01/13 by Ioannis Avramopoulos, Avramopoulos, Ioannis · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1601.03162
openalex publication_date 2016/01/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The stag hunt (or assurance game) is a simple game that has been used as a\nprototype of a variety of social coordination problems (ranging from the social\ncontract to the adoption of technical standards). Players have the option to\neither use a superior cooperative strategy whose payoff depends on the other\nplayers' choices or use an inferior strategy whose payoff is independent of\nwhat other players do; the cooperative strategy may incur a loss if\nsufficiently many other players do not cooperate. Stag hunts have two (strict)\npure Nash equilibria, namely, universal cooperation and universal defection (as\nwell as a mixed equilibrium of low predictive value). Selection of the inferior\n(pure) equilibrium is called a coordination failure. In this paper, we present\nand analyze using game-theoretic techniques mechanisms aiming to avert\ncoordination failures and incite instead selection of the superior equilibrium.\nOur analysis is based on the solution concepts of Nash equilibrium, dominance\nsolvability, as well as a formalization of the notion of "incremental\ndeployability," which is shown to be keenly relevant to the sink equilibrium.\n