2011/09/06 by Horace P. Yuen, Yuen, Horace P. · 1 citation
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph) #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1109.1051
openalex publication_date 2011/09/06 · arxiv created 2012/10/15 · arxiv updated 2012/10/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
It is repeatedly and persistently claimed in the literature that a specific trace criterion d would guarantee universal composition security in quantum cryptography. Currently that is the sole basis of unconditional security claim in quantum key distribution. In this paper, it is shown that just security against known-plaintext attacks when the generated key is used in direct encryption is not provided by d. The problem is directly connected with several general problems in the existing unconditional security proofs in quantum key distribution. A number of issues will be clarified concerning the nature of true security, privacy amplification, key generation rate and the mathematical approach needed for their determination in concrete protocols.