2012/03/27 by Po‐An Chen, Po-An Chen, Chen, Po-An +2
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1203.5945
This version was posted without enough prior discussion with my collaborator. My collaborator would prefer it not to be posted at this time
arxiv created 2012/04/11 · arxiv updated 2012/04/12
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders' utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j's utility.