2012/01/26 by Vineet Abhishek, Abhishek, Vineet, Ian A. Kash +3
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Blockchain Technology Applications and Security #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Optimization and Search Problems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1201.5621
openalex publication_date 2012/01/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study a model of congestible resources, where pricing and scheduling are intertwined. Motivated by the problem of pricing cloud instances, we model a cloud computing service as linked GI/GI/⋅ queuing systems where the provider chooses to offer a fixed pricing service, a dynamic market based service, or a hybrid of both, where jobs can be preempted in the market-based service. Users (jobs), who are heterogeneous in both the value they place on service and their cost for waiting, then choose between the services offered. Combining insights from auction theory with queuing theory we are able to characterize user equilibrium behavior, and show its insensitivity to the precise market design mechanism used. We then provide theoretical and simulation based evidence suggesting that a fixed price typically, though not always, generates a higher expected revenue than the hybrid system for the provider.