Proportional Representation in Approval-based Committee Voting and Beyond

2018/02/03 by Haris Aziz, Aziz, Haris · 1 citation
Computer Science · #68Q15 #91A12 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #F.2 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #J.4 #acm:68Q15 #acm:91A12 #cs.GT #msc:68Q15 #msc:91A12

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.00882

This paper was written as a companion paper to the authors's talk at the Dagstuhl Seminar on Voting: Beyond Simple Majorities and Single-Winner Elections (25--30, June 2017)

arxiv created 2018/02/03 · arxiv updated 2018/02/06

Abstract

Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some recent ideas and results on axioms and rules for proportional representation in committee voting.

Cited by

• Core Existence in Approval-Based Committee Elections with up to Five Voter Types

Related

• Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms
• Proportional Justified Representation
• The Expanding Approvals Rule: Improving Proportional Representation and Monotonicity
• A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
• Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules