2020/09/24 by Agustín G. Bonifacio, Bonifacio, Agustin G., Elena Iñarra +3 · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2009.11689
openalex publication_date 2020/09/24 · openalex created_date 2022/07/25 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.