2023/04/11 by Meng-Jhang Fong, Fong, Meng-Jhang, Po-Hsuan Lin +3
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2304.05515
openalex publication_date 2023/04/11 · openalex created_date 2023/04/15 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Cursed Equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) has been a leading theory for explaining winner's-curse-type behavior in static Bayesian games, but it faces conceptual limitations when applied to dynamic games. Two recent extensions, Cursed Sequential Equilibrium (CSE) by Fong, Lin and Palfrey (2025) and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium (SCE) by Cohen and Li (2026), address these limitations in fundamentally different ways. Complementing these two papers, this paper provides a systematic comparison of CSE and SCE, clarifying their conceptual foundations and technical implications, including their notions of cursedness, belief updating, and treatment of public histories.