2007/02/25 by Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson, Pritchard, Geoffrey +1
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #91B12 #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Probability (math.PR) #math.OC #math.PR #msc:91B12
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.math/0702752
20 pages, submitted to Journal of Economic Theory
arxiv created 2007/02/25 · openalex publication_date 2007/02/25 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be recruited to form a manipulating coalition. It is shown that the manipulation problem may be well approximated by a very simple linear program in two variables. This permits a comparative analysis of the asymptotic (large-population) manipulability of the various rules. It is seen that the manipulation resistance of positional rules with 5 or 6 (or more) candidates is quite different from the more commonly analyzed 3- and 4-candidate cases.