2021/11/27 by Xingjian Zhang, Pei Zeng, Zhang, Xingjian +7 · 1 citation
Computer Science · #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Physics (quant-ph) #Quantum-Dot Cellular Automata
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.13855
openalex publication_date 2021/11/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Complementarity is an essential feature of quantum mechanics. The preparation of an eigenstate of one observable implies complete randomness in its complementary observable. In quantum cryptography, complementarity allows us to formulate security analyses in terms of phase-error correction. However, in the device-independent regime that offers security without device characterization, the concept becomes much subtler. Security proofs of device-independent quantum cryptography tasks are often complex and quite different from those of their more standard device-dependent cousins. The existing proofs pose huge challenges to experiments, among which large data-size requirement is a crux. Here, we show the complementarity security origin of the device-independent tasks. By linking complementarity with quantum nonlocality, we recast the device-independent scheme into a quantum error correction protocol. Going beyond the identical-and-independent-distribution case, we consider the most general attack. We generalize the sample entropy in classical Shannon theory for the finite-size analysis. Our method exhibits good finite-size performance and brings the device-independent scheme to a more practical regime. Applying it to the data in a recent ion-trap-based device-independent quantum key distribution experiment, one could reduce the requirement on data size to less than a third. Furthermore, the complementarity approach can be naturally extended to advantage key distillation to ease experiments by tolerating higher loss and lower transmittance.