Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians

2017/10/01 by Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, Johanna Rickne · 4 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Social Policy and Reform Studies

paper · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12494

Abstract

We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information on occupational and residence status show that the higher earnings are unlikely reflect an illegitimate allocation of jobs. But the evidence suggests that children of election‐winning mayors are more likely to postpone tertiary education and remain in their parents’ municipality to work.

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