Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs

1987/01/01 by Paul Klemperer · 261 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Deterrence (psychology) #Deterrence theory #Digital Platforms and Economics #Economics #Law #Law and economics #Merger and Competition Analysis #Political science #Public economics

paper · doi:10.2307/3038233

published in The Economic Journal 97, 99 (Oxford University Press)

openalex publication_date 1987/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Abstract

Paul Klemperer; Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue Supplement, 1 December 1987, Pages 99–117, htt

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