Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools

2021/01/31 by Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Leaver, Clare +5 · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #General Economics (econ.GN) #Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare #School Choice and Performance

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2102.00444

openalex publication_date 2021/01/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

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