Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

1993/09/01 by Hans Carlsson, Eric van Damme · 1,597 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Artificial intelligence #Computer science #Econometrics #Economic theories and models #Economics #Equilibrium selection #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Game theory #Mathematical economics #Repeated game #Selection (genetic algorithm)

paper · doi:10.2307/2951491

published in Econometrica 61(5), 989 (Wiley)

openalex publication_date 1993/09/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/02

Abstract

A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoffstructure is determined by a rairdom draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game.For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise forces the players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion.When the uncertainty is one-dimensional, the result may be obtained by repeated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game."1'his pxper is a combinat.ion,and a subatantial generalization, of Carlxson (19R9) and Carlason and Van Damme (1989).Some basic ideas on global games and their telation to risk dominance originate from a note, written by Cadseon in 1985.The suthora thank R.einhard Selten, Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Jdrgen Weibull and various seminar audiences Cor helpful comments.The conatructive criticiam of several referees considerably improved the paper's quality.

Citations

• The Bargaining Problem
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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