2018/05/31 by David Butler, Butler, David, David Aspinall +3
Computer Science · #Advanced Authentication Protocols Security #Cryptographic Implementations and Security #Cryptography and Data Security #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1805.12482
openalex publication_date 2018/05/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
In cryptography, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow participants to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Recent breakthroughs are bringing MPC into practice, solving fundamental challenges for secure distributed computation. Just as with classic protocols for encryption and key exchange, precise guarantees are needed for MPC designs and implementations; any flaw will give attackers a chance to break privacy or correctness. In this paper we present the first (as far as we know) formalisation of some MPC security proofs. These proofs provide probabilistic guarantees in the computational model of security, but have a different character to machine proofs and proof tools implemented so far --- MPC proofs use a simulation approach, in which security is established by showing indistinguishability between execution traces in the actual protocol execution and an ideal world where security is guaranteed by definition. We show that existing machinery for reasoning about probabilistic programs adapted to this setting, paving the way to precisely check a new class of cryptography arguments. We implement our proofs using the CryptHOL framework inside Isabelle/HOL.