Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule

2024/12/17 by R. Pablo Arribillaga, Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Agustín G. Bonifacio +1 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.12495

openalex publication_date 2024/12/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability.

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• Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences

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