2018/11/22 by Burt C. Hopkins, Hopkins, Burt C.
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Appearance #Husserl #Phenomenological Evidence #Phenomenological Manifold #Phenomenological Reflection #Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy #Philosophy and Historical Thought #Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
paper · doi:10.6093/1593-7178/5942
openalex publication_date 2018/11/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/07
A strand in the contemporary engagement with Husserl’s phenomenology is united by the critical judgment that the appearing of the appearance paradoxically does not appear in that phenomenology. I argue that it does. My argument has three parts. The first argues that, contra Heidegger, the appearance in Husserl doesn’t involve the “self-showing” of anything. The second argues that the appearance in Husserl is a phenomenon doubly purified, from 1) its index of existence and 2) its empirical facticity. The third argues that the appearing of the appearance appears in manifolds of lived-experiences that in turn appear in the only foundation that – from beginning to end – Husserl sought to establish for a philosophical science: the reflectively accessed unities of sense (Sinn) given in these manifolds that alone are capable of manifesting phenomenological evidence.