2003/10/15 by A. K. M. Azhar, Wat Wan Abdullah, Azhar, A. K. M. +8
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis #Condensed Matter (cond-mat) #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #cond-mat
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cond-mat/0310340
pdf only. 13 pages. A version of this paper was presented at the 8th Annual Workshop on Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents "WEHIA 2003", May 29-31 2003, Kiel, Germany
arxiv created 2003/10/15 · openalex publication_date 2003/10/15 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Seniority runs deep. As the saying goes for some conventions or institutions in some societies, seniority exhibits and engulfs into almost all nooks and corners of their organisations. This paper presents an analysis of the conflict between two groups in the run-up to seniority in these institutions. We overview the inspirations and practice of each group, and their conflict in the run-up to organisational seniority, and analyse the conflict using a simple model of a "Deviants' Dilemma" game played in a single population. Within the game's framework, we analyse the conditions for the evolutionary stable state and the stability of the proportions of each group, given a strategy resulting from learning based on rewards. We also provide a short discussion on the role of noise in the system and we conclude with some discussions on the generality and possible applications of the model.