The incompleteness of an incompleteness argument

2019/04/18 by Derichs, Joachim
#03B25 #03B99 #FOS: Mathematics #Logic (math.LO)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1904.08417

Abstract

Gödel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing that the contradiction that emerges at the end should be redirected to refute this initial assumption rather than the completeness of number theory

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