2009/11/05 by Loet Leydesdorff, Leydesdorff, Loet · 1 citation
Business, Management and Accounting · Neuroscience · Social Sciences · #Embodied and Extended Cognition #FOS: Physical sciences #Information Systems Theories and Implementation #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) #University-Industry-Government Innovation Models
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0911.1041
openalex publication_date 2009/11/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Although Luhmann formulated with modesty and precaution, for example in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990a, at pp. 412f.), that his theory claims to be a universal one because it is self-referential, the "operational closure" that follows from this assumption easily generates a problem for empirical research. Can a theory which considers society--and science as one of its subsystems--operationally closed, nevertheless contribute to the project of Enlightenment which Popper (1945) so vigorously identified as the driver of an open society? How can a theory which proclaims itself to be circular and universal nevertheless claim to celebrate "the triumph of the Enlightenment" Luhmann, (1990a, at p. 548)? Is the lack of an empirical program of research building on Luhmann's theory fortuitous or does it indicate that this theory should be considered as a philosophy rather than a heuristic for the explanation of operations in social systems?