2017/07/14 by Aidin Ferdowsi, Anibal Sanjab, Ferdowsi, Aidin +5
Engineering · Environmental Science · #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Water-Energy-Food Nexus Studies #Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1707.04589
A city's critical infrastructure such as gas, water, and power systems, are\nlargely interdependent since they share energy, computing, and communication\nresources. This, in turn, makes it challenging to endow them with fool-proof\nsecurity solutions. In this paper, a unified model for interdependent\ngas-power-water infrastructure is presented and the security of this model is\nstudied using a novel game-theoretic framework. In particular, a zero-sum\nnoncooperative game is formulated between a malicious attacker who seeks to\nsimultaneously alter the states of the gas-power-water critical infrastructure\nto increase the power generation cost and a defender who allocates\ncommunication resources over its attack detection filters in local areas to\nmonitor the infrastructure. At the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this\ngame, numerical results show that the expected power generation cost deviation\nis 35 % lower than the one resulting from an equal allocation of resources over\nthe local filters. The results also show that, at equilibrium, the\ninterdependence of the power system on the natural gas and water systems can\nmotivate the attacker to target the states of the water and natural gas systems\nto change the operational states of the power grid. Conversely, the defender\nallocates a portion of its resources to the water and natural gas states of the\ninterdependent system to protect the grid from state deviations.\n