Systemic Risks in CCP Networks

2016/04/01 by Russell Barker, Andrew Dickinson, Barker, Russell +5
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #91B02 #91B24 #91B55 #91B64 #91G60 #91G80 #Banking stability, regulation, efficiency #Credit Risk and Financial Regulations #FOS: Economics and business #Housing Market and Economics #Mathematical Finance (q-fin.MF) #Risk Management (q-fin.RM)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1604.00254

openalex publication_date 2016/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We propose a model for the credit and liquidity risks faced by clearing members of Central Counterparty Clearing houses (CCPs). This model aims to capture the features of: gap risk; feedback between clearing member default, market volatility and margining requirements; the different risks faced by various types of market participant and the changes in margining requirements a clearing member faces as the system evolves. By considering the entire network of CCPs and clearing members, we investigate the distribution of losses to default fund contributions and contingent liquidity requirements for each clearing member; further, we identify wrong-way risks between defaults of clearing members and market turbulence.

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