2012/12/12 by Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Porter, Ryan +5
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Optimization and Search Problems #Supply Chain and Inventory Management
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1301.0595
openalex publication_date 2012/12/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems.