A deterministic electoral system satisfying Arrow's four conditions in an easily approached limit

2025/02/11 by Sewell, Roger F.
#91B14 #FOS: Economics and business #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.07444

Abstract

In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that satisfies a different set of strictly stronger conditions. In this paper we discuss a deterministic electoral method satisfying those same stronger conditions in an appropriate sense; it is not a counterexample to either of these theorems. We attach a simple reference implementation written in C with executables for Linux and Windows.

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