2021/10/29 by Nicolas Pastrian, Pastrian, Nicolas
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) #econ.TH
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.00061
openalex publication_date 2021/10/29 · arxiv created 2021/11/08 · arxiv updated 2021/11/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We examine the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with behavioral types. In our model behavioral types always perfectly reveal their private information. We characterize the sufficient conditions that guarantee full extraction in a finite version of the reduced form environment of McAfee and Reny (1992). We found that the standard convex independence condition identified in Cremer and McLean (1988) is required only among the beliefs of strategic types, while a weaker condition is required for the beliefs of behavioral types.