2020/03/26 by Carlos E. González-Guillén, María Isabel González Vasco, González-Guillén, Carlos E. +5
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · Psychology · #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Deception detection and forensic psychology #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph) #cs.CR #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.12095
8 pages, 0 figures, 1 protocol review
openalex publication_date 2020/03/26 · arxiv created 2020/03/30 · arxiv updated 2020/03/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).