2012/04/02 by Jerome Renault, Renault, Jerome, Eilon Solan +3
Computer Science · Mathematics · #60J10 #91A05 #91A10 #91A20 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Probability (math.PR) #cs.GT #math.PR #msc:60J10 #msc:91A05 #msc:91A10 #msc:91A20
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1204.0323
arxiv created 2012/04/02 · arxiv updated 2012/04/03
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.