2024/01/07 by Benoît Decerf, Guillaume Haeringer, Decerf, Benoit +3 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #91B68 #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2401.03598
openalex publication_date 2024/01/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In school districts where assignments are exclusively determined by a clearinghouse students can only appeal their assignment with a valid reason. An assignment is incontestable if it is appeal-proof. We study incontestability when students do not observe the other students' preferences and assignments. Incontestability is shown to be equivalent to individual rationality, non-wastefulness, and respect for top-priority sets (a weakening of justified envy). Stable mechanisms and those Pareto dominating them are incontestable, as well as the Top-Trading Cycle mechanism (but Boston is not). Under a mild consistency property, incontestable mechanisms are i-indinstiguishable (Li, 2017), and share similar incentive properties.