On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria

2018/02/19 by Cardaliaguet, Pierre, Rainer, Catherine · 2 citations
#FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.06637

Abstract

Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.

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