Mechanism Design Approach for Energy Efficiency

2016/08/26 by Stefano Bistarelli, Rosario Culmone, Bistarelli, Stefano +5
Energy · Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Energy Efficiency and Management #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Green IT and Sustainability #Smart Grid Energy Management

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1608.07492

openalex publication_date 2016/08/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In this work we deploy a mechanism design approach for allocating a divisible commodity (electricity in our example) among consumers. We consider each consumer with an associated personal valuation function of the energy resource during a certain time interval. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. We start by presenting a very basic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we discuss its weakness and propose several more complex variants.

Citations

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