2019/01/22 by Robert Chuchro, Chuchro, Robert, Kyle D'Souza +3
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #General Economics (econ.GN) #Media Influence and Politics #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1901.07542
openalex publication_date 2019/01/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In almost every election cycle, the validity of the United States Electoral College is brought into question. The 2016 Presidential Election again brought up the issue of a candidate winning the popular vote but not winning the Electoral College, with Hillary Clinton receiving close to three million more votes than Donald Trump. However, did the popular vote actually determine the most liked candidate in the election? In this paper, we demonstrate that different voting policies can alter which candidate is elected. Additionally, we explore the trade-offs between each of these mechanisms. Finally, we introduce two novel mechanisms with the intent of electing the least polarizing candidate.