2024/03/20 by Ye Tao, Hongyi Wu, Tao, Ye +7
Computer Science · Social Sciences · #Access Control and Trust #Cryptography and Data Security #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) #Service-Oriented Architecture and Web Services
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2403.14020
openalex publication_date 2024/03/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Pseudonyms are widely used in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) to protect the location privacy of vehicles. However, the unlinkability nature of pseudonyms also enables Sybil attacks, where a malicious vehicle can pretend to be multiple vehicles at the same time. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol called zero-knowledge Proof of Distinct Identity (zk-PoDI,) which allows a vehicle to prove that it is not the owner of another pseudonym in the local area, without revealing its actual identity. Zk-PoDI is based on the Diophantine equation and zk-SNARK, and does not rely on any specific pseudonym design or infrastructure assistance. We show that zk-PoDI satisfies all the requirements for a practical Sybil-resistance pseudonym system, and it has low latency, adjustable difficulty, moderate computation overhead, and negligible communication cost. We also discuss the future work of implementing and evaluating zk-PoDI in a realistic city-scale simulation environment.