2012/09/29 by Avishay Maya, Maya, Avishay, Noam Nisan +1 · 2 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Supply Chain and Inventory Management #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1210.0155
19 pages, WINE 2012
arxiv created 2012/09/29 · openalex publication_date 2012/09/29 · arxiv updated 2012/10/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.