1985/07/01 by Paul A. Bjorn, Bjorn, Paul A., Quang Vuong +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #Income, Poverty, and Inequality
paper · pdf · doi:10.7907/wkyqn-xhh62
openalex publication_date 1985/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/15
Following Bjorn and Vuong (1984), a model for dummy endogenous variables is derived from a game theoretic framework where the equilibrium concept used is that of Stackelberg. A distinctive feature of our model is that it contains as a special case the usual recursive model for discrete endogenous variables [see e.g., Maddala and Lee (1976)]. A structural interpretation of this latter model can then be given in terms of a Stackelberg game in which the leader is indifferent to the follower's action. Finally, the model is applied to a study of husband/wife labor force participation.