LASCA: Learning Assisted Side Channel Delay Analysis for Hardware Trojan\n Detection

2020/01/17 by Ashkan Vakil, Vakil, Ashkan, Farnaz Behnia +9 · 1 citation
Engineering · Computer Science · #Integrated Circuits and Semiconductor Failure Analysis #Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security #Electrostatic Discharge in Electronics

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.06476

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis\n(LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution,\nunlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural\nNetwork to act as a process tracking watchdog for correlating the static timing\ndata (produced at design time) to the delay information obtained from clock\nfrequency sweeping (at test time) for the purpose of Trojan detection. Using\nthe LASCA flow, we detect close to 90% of Hardware Trojans in the simulated\nscenarios.\n

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