Memory-Aware Denial-of-Service Attacks on Shared Cache in Multicore Real-Time Systems

2020/05/21 by Bechtel, Michael, Yun, Heechul · 1 citation
#Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Hardware Architecture (cs.AR)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.10864

Abstract

In this paper, we identify that memory performance plays a crucial role in the feasibility and effectiveness for performing denial-of-service attacks on shared cache. Based on this insight, we introduce new cache DoS attacks, which can be mounted from the user-space and can cause extreme worst-case execution time (WCET) impacts to cross-core victims -- even if the shared cache is partitioned -- by taking advantage of the platform's memory address mapping information and HugePage support. We deploy these enhanced attacks on two popular embedded out-of-order multicore platforms using both synthetic and real-world benchmarks. The proposed DoS attacks achieve up to 111X WCET increases on the tested platforms.

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• Knock-Knock: Black-Box, Platform-Agnostic DRAM Address-Mapping Reverse Engineering

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