2025/07/01 by Abinash Panda, Panda, Abinash, Anup Pramanik +2
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2507.00913
openalex publication_date 2025/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We investigate preference domains under which every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) satisfies dictatorship. We identify a condition on domains called connected with distinct neighbours which is necessary for dictatorship under unanimity and local strategy-proofness. Further, we show that this condition is sufficient within the class of domains where every unanimous and locally strategy-proof scf satisfies tops-onlyness. While a complete characterization remains open, we also show that on domains that are connected with distinct neighbours, unanimity and strategy-proofness (a stronger requirement) imply dictatorship.