2014/11/17 by Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo +1 · 57 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Argument (complex analysis) #Attribution #Blame #CLARITY #Context (archaeology) #Corruption and Economic Development #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Government (linguistics) #Law #Law and economics #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Presidential system #Psychology #Public administration #Public relations #Scapegoating #Social psychology #Voting
paper · doi:10.1177/0010414014554693
published in Comparative Political Studies 48(4), 438-463 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2014/11/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
The importance of institutions in shaping citizens’ ability to punish or reward politicians for economic outcomes is well established. Where institutions divide authority, politicians can blame each other and citizens find it harder to assign responsibility for policy failures; where institutions clarify lines of authority, citizens can better hold politicians accountable. However, this argument assumes that citizens perceive policy responsibility as shared among political actors and this is not always the case. Looking at security policy, we argue that when policy responsibility is concentrated in a single actor the effect of institutions on blame attribution is different from what the economic voting literature predicts. Divided government in this context makes blame-shifting less effective and makes it more likely that citizens will punish incumbents. By contrast, the ability of executives to control the narrative around security failures by blaming the perpetrators, especially during unified government, can help them avoid blame.