2013/06/10 by Anthony J. McGann, Michael Latner · 35 citations
Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Algorithm #Computer science #Construct (python library) #Democracy #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #European Union Policy and Governance #Law #Law and economics #Liberal democracy #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Political science #Politics #Positive economics #Representative democracy #Social Policy and Reform Studies #Sociology #State (computer science) #Typology #Veto #Welfare state
paper · doi:10.1177/0010414012463883
published in Comparative Political Studies 46(7), 823-850 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2013/06/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
We present a theory of comparative political institutions based on the concept of consensus democracy and social choice theory. Unlike Lijphart, we argue that “consensus democracy” is not a special form of democracy characterized by mutual vetoes, but rather the simplest form of democracy, which we refer to as PR-majority rule. We construct a typology of political institutions based on differences with this simple model. Contra Tsebelis’s veto players approach, our theory predicts that PR-majority rule should be the most flexible form of democracy. We test this with data on overall patterns of government spending and on welfare state reform.