2008/10/27 by Emily Beaulieu, Susan D. Hyde, Susan Hyde · 167 citations
Social Sciences · #Boycott #Corruption and Economic Development #Criticism #Democracy #Democracy promotion #Democratization #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Incentive #Law #Market economy #Opposition (politics) #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics
paper · doi:10.1177/0010414008325571
published in Comparative Political Studies 42(3), 392-415 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2008/10/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
International efforts to promote democracy can have unanticipated effects. International election observation is perceived to increase domestic confidence in the electoral process and reduce fraud. Conversely, election boycotts are perceived to be more likely as electoral fairness decreases. The authors document a puzzling relationship between monitored elections and opposition party boycotts: Observers are associated with an increased boycott probability. They argue that international benefits for democratic elections give electoral autocrats the incentive to invite international observers and manipulate elections to minimize international criticism. This increase in “strategic manipulation” has led to changed incentives for opposition political parties, which have the most to lose from a manipulated but internationally certified election. Consequently, international monitors increase boycott probability. The authors support this explanation with an original data set of elections, boycotts, and international observers (1990 to 2002).