Evolution of cooperation and discrimination in software development

2004/01/01 by Daniel Eckert, Eckert, Daniel, Wolfgang H. Janko +3
Social Sciences · Decision Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Game Theory and Applications

paper · pdf · doi:10.57938/01642bd1-1ee7-4cc8-b14b-a0b1a2caffad

Abstract

Software development projects typically involve repeated interactions among several groups of people. This setting seems well suited for an analysis by means of the standard-model of the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Computer simulations of a population of stochastic reactive strategies show that the existence of intergroup discrimination can be modeled endogeneously as a result of noise due to misperception of the opponent's move. (author's abstract)

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