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Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem in Degenerate Systems

2019/10/23 by Kaitong Hu, Zhenjie Ren, Hu, Kaitong +3
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #60H30 #91A23 #91A35 #Economic theories and models #FOS: Mathematics #Insurance, Mortality, Demography, Risk Management #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Probability (math.PR) #Stochastic processes and financial applications

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.10527

openalex publication_date 2019/10/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In this paper we present a variational calculus approach to Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on finite horizon in degenerate stochastic systems, such as filtered partially observed linear systems. Our work extends the existing methodologies in the Principal-Agent literature using dynamic programming and BSDE representation of the contracts in the non-degenerate controlled stochastic systems. We first solve the Principal's problem in an enlarged set of contracts defined by a forward-backward SDE system given by the first order condition of the Agent's problem using variational calculus. Then we use the sufficient condition of the Agent's problem to verify that the optimal contract that we obtain by solving the Principal's problem is indeed implementable (i.e. belonging to the admissible contract set). Importantly we consider the control problem in a weak formulation. Finally, we give explicit solution of the Principal-Agent problem in partially observed linear systems and extend our results to some mean field interacting Agents case.

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