Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria: Revisited

2020/02/13 by Takalloo, Mahdi, Kwon, Changhyun
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2002.05510

Abstract

For single-commodity networks, the increase of the price of anarchy is bounded by a factor of (1+ε)^p from above, when the travel demand is increased by a factor of 1+ε and the latency functions are polynomials of degree at most p. We show that the same upper bound holds for multi-commodity networks and provide a lower bound as well.

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