2019/12/14 by Aditya Mvs, MVS, Aditya, Chitrarth Shrivastava +3 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Engineering · #Cooperative Communication and Network Coding #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #ICT Impact and Policies #Information Theory (cs.IT) #Social and Information Networks (cs.SI)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1912.06975
openalex publication_date 2019/12/14 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider a set of cellular users associated with a base station (BS) in a\ncellular network that employs Device-to-device (D2D) communication. A subset of\nthe users request for some files from the BS. Now, some of the users can\npotentially act as relays and forward the requested files, or partitions of\nfiles, from the BS to some of the requesting users (destination nodes) over D2D\nlinks. However, this requires cooperation among the cellular users. In this\npaper, we seek conditions under which users have an incentive to cooperate with\neach other. We model the above scenario using the frameworks of cooperative\ngame theory and stable partitions in coalitional games. We consider two\ndifferent models for file transfer within a coalition: (i) Model A, in which\nthe BS can split a file into multiple partitions and send these partitions to\ndifferent relays, which multicast the partitions to the destination nodes of\nthe coalition, and (ii) Model B, in which for each file, the BS sends the\nentire file to a single relay, which multicasts it to the destination nodes of\nthe coalition. First, we explore the question of whether it is beneficial for\nall the cellular users to cooperate, i.e., whether the grand coalition is\nstable. For this we use the solution concept of core from cooperative game\ntheory. We show that, in general, the above coalitional game under Model A may\nhave an empty core. Next, we provide conditions under which the core is always\nnon-empty and a Dc-stable partition always exists. Also, we show that under\nModel B, the problem of assigning relays to destination nodes so as to maximize\nthe sum of utilities of all the users is NP-Complete. Finally, we show via\nnumerical computations that a significant reduction in the energy expenditure\nof cellular users can be achieved via cooperation.\n